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Abstract
How does exposure to refugees influence political behavior? We present evidence 
from Hungary, a country with widespread anti-immigration attitudes, that short term 
exposure during the 2015 refugee crisis predicts anti-refugee voting and sentiment. 
We code exposure to refugees at the settlement level using reports from state media, 
an independent online news site, and an online social media aggregator. Settlements 
through which refugees traveled showed significantly higher anti-refugee voting in 
a national referendum in 2016. The effect decreases sharply with distance. Using a 
difference-in-differences model, we find that the far-right opposition gained, while the 
governing right-wing party lost votes in these settlements in subsequent parliamentary 
elections. This suggests incumbents are punished by voters skeptical of immigration 
regardless of their policy position. Survey data supports this finding of a competition 
among right-wing parties, as individuals in exposed settlements are more fearful of 
immigrants and support restrictive policies only if they identify as right-wing.
The issue of migration has moved to the core of the European political conversa-
tion since the 2015 refugee crisis. It is likely to stay on the agenda as subsequent 
years have set new records for the highest number of people forcibly displaced 
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and searching refuge on record (UNHCR 2020). Despite the broad political sali-
ence of the issue, the local circumstances framing the encounters that natives have 
with refugees and immigrants vary widely. For instance refugees may seek to set-
tle in a country or may just be passing through. In the latter case we can expect 
greater geographic differences in the likelihood of natives encountering refugees 
and that interactions between natives and refugees are brief and one-time. In such 
situations, political elites including governments have a critical role: some scape-
goat immigrants rather than sanctioning positive engagement. Thereby, they  can 
frame the context in which refugees make first impressions on voters in a negative 
light (Harteveld et al. 2017; Ivarsflaten 2005). As populist and radical right parties 
hostile to immigration become more successful and increasingly participate in gov-
ernment  (Kaltwasser et  al. 2017; Bustikova 2017), it is important to observe how 
voters react to nativist appeals when they come from parties in government, and how 
such responses are conditional on previous political attitudes and actual encounters 
with refugees.
In this paper we present evidence that exposure to refugees during the 2015 
European refugee crisis affected political behavior in Hungary, a country at the 
center of the crisis, given the large number of refugees entering the country and 
its government’s nativist response. The Hungarian case differs from those used in 
recent work to examine the effect of contact with refugees on native political behav-
ior  (Hangartner et  al. 2018; Dinas et  al. 2019; Steinmayr 2020) because refugees 
were passing through the country in an irregular manner and their interactions with 
locals were highly transient. Indeed, because of staggered border closures, changing 
opportunities to travel by train or bus, and spontaneous decisions of groups of refu-
gees to try to reach Austria on foot, many Hungarian settlements were only exposed 
to refugees on a single occasion. Another unique aspect of the Hungarian case is that 
the ruling Fidesz party, led by Viktor Orbán, mobilized radically against the refu-
gees in the aftermath of the crisis. Migration became the central question of Hungar-
ian politics in subsequent years (Krekó and Enyedi 2018). The share of Hungarians 
who named immigration as one of the country’s most important problems increased 
from close to zero in mid 2013 to over thirty percent in November 2015 (European 
Commission 2016) and has remained high ever since.
Shortly after the crisis, Hungary held a national referendum on proposed EU 
refugee quotas. We use this vote to measure the effect of short-term contact with 
refugees on voting behavior at the settlement (municipality) level. The results of the 
referendum allow us to more directly measure anti-refugee sentiment than previous 
studies which use far-right party outcomes as a proxy (Dinas et al. 2019; Steinmayr 
2020; Dustmann et al. 2018; Vertier and Viskanic 2018). We find a significant back-
lash effect: settlements exposed to the crisis were significantly more likely to vote 
against the EU quota in the referendum.
Though Fidesz won a significant victory in the 2018 parliamentary elections with 
a campaign centered on the topic of migration, we observe an interesting difference 
in voting trends from the 2014 elections among exposed and non-exposed settle-
ments. In settlements exposed to the refugee crisis, there was a small but signif-
icant move from Fidesz towards the far-right opposition Jobbik party, which also 
took a hardline anti-refugee stance during the campaign. This suggests that beyond 
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the issue-ownership theory favored by previous work  (Dinas et  al. 2019), there is 
an anti-incumbent aspect to anti-refugee voting induced by exposure to crisis which 
ruling parties cannot exploit. Voters inflamed by direct exposure seem to punish the 
ruling party  (see also Bratti et al. 2020).
We find further evidence that exposure influences voting behavior only among right-
wing voters using survey data collected between the crisis and referendum. We confirm 
that individuals from exposed settlements are more likely to express anti-refugee policy 
preferences, but find that this is conditional on voting for parties on the right.
We proceed by outlining a theoretical framework for understanding the effect of 
exposure to the refugee crisis on voting behavior and reviewing related work. After 
describing the specifics of our case, we present our data and modelling strategy. We 
then proceed to test the impact of short-term exposure to refugees in different set-
tings: its effect on voting in the national anti-refugee referendum, the electoral out-
comes of two anti-refugee parties (one in government, one in opposition) in parlia-
mentary elections before and after the crisis, and individual-level survey responses 
collected shortly after the crisis.
Motivation, Theory and Related Work
The so-called 2015 European refugee crisis has led to renewed interest in how 
natives react to the arrival of immigrants and refugees both in terms of attitudes 
and political behavior. The crisis has drastically increased the number of arrivals 
to Europe and changed patterns of interactions between natives and new arrivals. 
While many classic studies build on the contact theory by Allport (1954) which pos-
its that social interactions can lead to a reduction of prejudices  (see also: Pettigrew 
et al. 2011; Paluck et al. 2018), the conditions for sustained contact were certainly 
not met in Hungary and many other countries during the crisis. As in other so-called 
transit countries, refugees moved on as soon as they were able to, often only spend-
ing days or even hours in a country. We suggest this time was too short to overcome 
barriers of language and culture.
While data from Eastern European countries on the route taken by the refugees 
is limited, evidence from other regions supports this notion: in a study of reactions 
to refugees in Austria, Steinmayr (2020, p. 23) argues that the arrival of refugees to 
settlements created substantial anxiety which reduced only after refugees had lived 
in the respective settlement for some time. Although prejudice may be moderated in 
the long run, short and involuntary encounters may even inflame prejudice (on the 
difference between short- and long-term effects: Enos 2014). Hence, Hungary pre-
sents an ideal case to study the conditions under which short-term encounters may 
have long-lasting consequences.
In explaining why and when citizens may perceive refugees as a threat in the 
US context, Hopkins (2010) shows that reactions to immigrants are most likely to 
be hostile when communities experience a sudden influx of immigration and when 
national media rhetoric presents this as a threat. He argues that citizens are typically 
unaware of immigration levels but that they are particularly sensitive to changes to 
these levels, which he finds may lead to politicization of the topic (Hopkins 2010, p. 
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42). In this case, local arrivals and hostile national rhetoric combine to produce neg-
ative reactions to refugees.
In this context Hungary provides an interesting case: a significant amount of 
refugees passed through the country in summer and autumn 2015 on their way to 
Western Europe, until the borders were sealed by a physical barrier in the fall. The 
topic dramatically gained salience for voters as the share of Hungarians who named 
immigration as one of the country’s most important problems increased from close 
to zero in mid 2013 to over thirty percent in November 2015 (European Commis-
sion 2016). While Hungary fits the situation outlined by Hopkins (2010) regarding 
the salience of anti-immigration rhetoric  (Bocskor 2018), exposure in most places 
was temporary. In many cases, refugees merely passed settlements on their way 
through the country. Indeed the overall level of foreigners living in Hungary has not 
changed significantly in the period from 2008 (175,000) to 2019 (180,000) (Hun-
garian Central Statistical Office, 2019). This situation provides a test of the effects 
observed by Hopkins with a key difference: a subsequent return to the previous level 
of immigrants.
We suggest that this reversion to the status quo does not change the substantive 
effect on political behavior of residents of Hungarian settlements exposed to the cri-
sis. One likely contributing factor is the strong anti-refugee message in the public 
discourse in the years following the crisis: the manner in which governments address 
the issue of immigration has consequences for citizens’ attitudes on the issue (Hain-
mueller and Hopkins 2014). Voters are susceptible to elite opinion leaders who are 
skeptical towards immigration more generally (Ivarsflaten 2005). In this, Hungary is 
an extreme case as Hungary’s governing elites actively promoted fears of refugees, 
for example by evoking the idea of an “invasion”. The governing party and the most 
popular opposition party at the time espoused anti-refugee positions, while Hungar-
ian media rarely gave refugees a voice (Bernáth and Messing 2016). As individuals 
interpret their personal experiences through the lens of public discourse, short-term 
encounters, especially with groups of refugees, will reify the framing of refugees as 
dangerous. Moreover, such encounters are likely to increase the salience of immi-
gration for citizens which in turn may have important behavioral consequences 
(Dennison 2019).
Several other studies have analyzed the political outcomes of the recent refugee 
crisis, albeit with different results. Evidence from France  (Vertier and Viskanic 
2018) and Austria  (Steinmayr 2020) exploiting quasi-random refugee settlement 
programs find support for the contact hypothesis in the context of long-term con-
tact. In both countries, settlements receiving refugees were less likely to vote for 
the far-right in subsequent elections. Short-term exposure during the crisis has been 
studied using data from the Greek islands. Dinas et al. (2019) find an increase in the 
vote share of the far-right Golden Dawn on islands exposed to the refugee crisis. 
Hangartner et al. (2018) find more negative attitudes towards refugees on the same 
islands in a survey fielded almost two years later.
The Hungarian case presents an opportunity to revisit two lines of research 
about the effect of short term exposure on political behavior and to address gaps 
therein. One issue with previous works cited above is that they measure change 
in voting behavior using presidential or parliamentary votes for right-wing 
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parties  (Dinas et  al. 2019; Steinmayr 2020; Dustmann et  al. 2018; Vertier and 
Viskanic 2018). Though anti-immigration is a uniting element of right-wing 
party ideologies in Europe  (Ivarsflaten 2008), citizens may vote for them for 
other reasons, for example because of their culturally conservative programs. As 
Hungary held a national referendum on a refugee related policy question shortly 
after the crisis, we can examine the relationship between exposure during the cri-
sis and anti-refugee voting attitudes more directly through voting behavior. We 
assume experiences with refugees in local contexts serve as reference, tying the 
crisis to everyday life. Even if their presence was transient and contact limited, 
images and anecdotes of unfamiliar refugees in familiar places will later influence 
political attitudes on immigration. This familiarity does not stop at the borders of 
individuals’ own settlement but also includes their immediate surroundings and 
places residents frequently travel to. The media’s intense coverage of the refugee 
crisis meant Hungarians also saw images of refugees in neighboring settlements, 
even if they and their immediate social contacts did not directly witness the inci-
dent. All Hungarians were exposed to the outlined negative rhetorical imagery. 
Whether citizens living in settlements near the refugee routes personally saw ref-
ugees, heard about them through their social networks, or saw what happened on 
state television, their familiarity with the setting personalizes the events. Hence, 
we expect the effect of exposure to go beyond the location of exposure itself and 
include nearby settlements. 
H1: Hungarian settlements exposed to refugees during the crisis are more likely to vote 
against refugee resettlement quotas in the 2016 referendum. The effect extends to 
nearby settlements but decreases sharply with distance.
A second point of interest in this line of research we reevaluate is whether 
exposed voters alter their voting behavior to punish the government or to support 
anti-immigration policy. So far, studies can only indirectly control for this, e.g. by 
looking into the electoral gains by other opposition parties. For example, Dinas 
et al. (2019) argue that votes for the Golden Dawn, a far-right opposition party in 
Greece, are policy-votes rather than anti-government votes. In Hungary we can 
disentangle this question by comparing the change in vote shares of Fidesz, the 
governing right-wing party, and Jobbik, a far-right opposition party, across par-
liamentary elections from 2014 and 2018.
We suggest that the policy aspect is not the main driver of the vote for the 
radical right in settlements exposed to the crisis. A key aspect of right parties’ 
capacity to benefit from short-term exposure may be due to disappointment with 
governing parties. A study from Italy indicates that settlements hosting more 
refugees were significantly less likely to support Matteo Renzi’s proposed con-
stitutional amendment, a referendum that had no direct link to the refugee cri-
sis  (Bratti et al. 2020). While right-wing parties may benefit disproportionately, 
studies of right-wing populist parties have shown these parties frequently claim 
that governing elites prioritize the interest of immigrants above those of the 
native population (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 14; de Cleen 2017, 350). More 
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generally, it is difficult for governing parties to shift responsibility for immigra-
tion under their watch. While Fidesz attempted to solve this dilemma by adopting 
a tough stance on immigrants and trying to physically constrain immigrants to 
few places, exposed settlements were the few places that nevertheless experienced 
the refugee crisis directly. Thus, citizens in these settlements may be discontent 
with the government’s handling of the immigration crisis and cast their ballot for 
the opposition Jobbik instead. Hence, we argue that policy considerations shape a 
voting behavior that is ultimately motivated by disappointment with incumbents. 
H2: Jobbik, the anti-refugee party in opposition, gained votes relative to Fidesz, the 
anti-refugee party in government, in settlements exposed to the crisis.
Given this hypothesis of a reshuffling of voters on the right, it is natural to ask if 
there is heterogeneity in the effect of exposure based on partisanship. If exposure 
also changes the attitudes of left-wing voters towards immigration, Fidesz may ulti-
mately benefit from a strengthening of the right camp, even if the party loses some 
voters to its opposition competitor Jobbik.
We suggest that the effect of exposure is conditioned by political attitudes. We 
do so, in part because of the strongly partisan nature of the immigration issue: Evi-
dence suggest that voters adjust their views on immigration to the position of their 
party  (Harteveld et  al. 2017) and individuals may resort to motivated reasoning 
based on partisan ideology in their interpretation of experiences with immigrants. 
Similarly, issue salience, an important predictor of vote choice and potentially rele-
vant for attitudes, also varies for citizens dependent on their party attachment (Neun-
dorf and Adams 2018; Dennison 2019).
While it is unclear if the effect of exposure conforms to such partisan pressures, 
prior evidence provides us with reasons to think so: recent evidence suggests that 
inaccurate perceptions about the size of foreign-born populations are a consequence 
of anti-refugee attitudes, and not their cause  (Hopkins et  al. 2018). Thus, citizens 
who are sceptical towards immigration may experience the refugee crisis as more 
threatening.1 To borrow a term from Sniderman et  al. (2004), we posit that short 
exposure galvanizes constituencies already concerned with the topic. Given that pol-
icy on immigration and refugees in Hungary is a significantly partisan issue and has 
become increasingly so during the crisis, we propose that the anti-refugee reaction 
of citizens to exposure to refugees during the crisis is a right-wing phenomenon. 
H3: The effect of refugee exposure on political behavior depends on an individual’s 
political attitudes. Short-term exposure is more likely to induce anti-immigrant 
sentiments in right-wing voters.
1 Additionally, in a study of extended contact Homola and Tavits (2017) find that contact with immi-
grants only reduces threat perceptions significantly for individuals with left-wing attitudes because of 
their higher openness to change. When exposure is passing, we suggest that the opposite mechanism may 
apply. A brief experience may not impact left partisans but reinforce the perception that outsiders are 




Hungary is more ethnically homogeneous than most other European countries. The 
most common immigrants to Hungary are ethnic Hungarians coming from neigh-
boring countries. Since 1990 immigration to Hungary has functioned, both formally 
and informally, as a two track system distinguishing between ethnic Hungarians and 
other immigrants (Nyíri 2003; Bocskor 2018). This framework reflects the negative 
Hungarian attitude towards refugees in particular and non-Hungarian immigrants in 
general  (Simonovits et  al. 2016; Enyedi et  al. 2005; Messing and Ságvári 2016). 
Immigration of non-Hungarians was not previously a significant topic in Hungarian 
politics. However, nation and nationality were salient topics in other regards e.g. 
the question of citizenship for ethnic Hungarians from abroad (Batory 2010). While 
certain ethnic groups certainly have advantages in questions of immigration in all 
European states, the institutionalized two-tier system in Hungary facilitates xeno-
phobia, for example against the small Chinese and Vietnamese immigrant communi-
ties (Nyíri 2003). Indeed, in a comparative analysis using the European Social Sur-
vey, Bail (2008) finds that in Hungary symbolic boundaries, conceptual distinctions 
used by majority groups to construct notions of “us” and “them”, have the strongest 
racial component of all 21 countries. This fertile ground of ethnic prejudice may 
have been amplified by media reporting about the crisis, similar to how anti-Roma 
discourse has entered the mainstream (Vidra and Fox 2014).
2015 Refugee Crisis
The importance of immigration as a political issue in Hungary changed drastically in 
2015, as rising immigration numbers and attacks in western Europe led to the politi-
cal mobilization of the topic on the right. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
began to frame immigration as a threat to Hungary in January 2015 in the aftermath 
of the attack on Charlie Hebdo. The government mailed a “national consultation” 
questionnaire to each Hungarian citizen on the subjects of immigration and terror-
ism. The questionnaire was criticized for its leading questions and its framing of the 
issue2.
While immigration numbers had been on the rise since 2014, it was only in sum-
mer 2015 that refugee traffic reached its high point and that the issue gained traction 
with the wider public. As Hungary was the first Schengen country besides Greece 
before destination countries like Austria and Germany on the so-called Balkan 
Route, a land route taken by refugees from Greece, nearly 400,000 refugees were 
registered in Hungary in 2015. Most arrived in August, September and October 
and were not able to continue their journey at first, due to the EU’s Dublin Regu-
lation which required refugees to apply for asylum in the first Member State they 
reached. We visualize the number of refugees entering Hungary in 2015 in Fig. 1. 
2 For example: “Do you think that Hungary could be the target of an act of terror in the next few years?” 
and “We hear different views on the issue of immigration. There are some who think that economic 
migrants jeopardise the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians. Do you agree?”
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The majority of these refugees entered at the Serbian border, making this area a fre-
quent focus of public debate.
The patterns of movement of refugees through Hungary during the crisis was 
highly irregular. While most refugees entered the country at border crossings with 
Serbia and then later Croatia, they took many different routes to reach Austria 
depending on the stage of the refugee crisis. Some refugees were taken to camps in 
different parts of the country by bus or train. Others managed to get to Budapest, the 
transportation hub on the way to Austria, but were then blocked from proceeding. In 
one memorable case, a group of refugees in Budapest boarded a train to a refugee 
camp in Bicske, thinking that it was going to Vienna. They refused to disembark 
and remained in Bicske for some time (Kallius et al. 2016). We highlight additional 
examples of irregular movement when we introduce our measure of refugee con-
tact. For now we emphasize that the dynamically changing regulations consistently 
scrambled the routes taken by the refugees.
This observation suggests two ways in which the Hungarian case is distinguished 
from the experience on Greece’s so-called “hot-spot” islands. First, geography more 
significantly determined which islands became hot-spots in Greece, while volatility 
in policy was a more significant factor in explaining where refugees went in Hun-
gary. Second, while both Greek and Hungarian natives typically had transient or 
one-off encounters with individual refugees, the Greek hot-spots were more persis-
tent over time, with new refugees passing through the same places for an extended 
period of time. In the Hungarian case, refugees were only present in most specific 
locations for a short amount of time.
Despite the transient nature of the crisis, the issue of migration remained impor-
tant. This is because for the Hungarian government, decreasing migration became a 
central goal. This was realized through the construction of a fence along the borders 
with Serbia and Croatia. When the fence along the Serbian border was completed 
on September 18th 2015, the Hungarian authorities closed the border, diverting the 
refugees through Croatia. One month later, that border was closed too. Afterwards, 
Fig. 1  Number of refugees entering Hungary daily in 2015. The Serbian border was sealed on September 
18th, causing a brief, sharp decrease in entries. The Croatian border was sealed on October 17th, practi-
cally ending the inflow of refugees to Hungary. Source: police.hu - Border information 
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very few refugees entered Hungary as the government drastically restricted the num-
ber of legal entries via so-called “transit zones” at the border. However, public dis-
cussion regarding how to deal with refugees and how to manage Hungary’s border 
has continued since then as the centerpiece of the ruling party’s political discourse.
Political Consequences and the 2016 Quota Referendum
With its restrictive immigration policy and intensive mobilization around the issue 
(Bocskor 2018; Goździak and Márton 2018), the governing Fidesz party created 
a strong link between the prevailing political cleavages and immigration (Palonen 
2018; Barna and Koltai 2019). Immigration had previously been a marginal issue 
in Hungarian party competition with cultural competition centered around national-
ism and cultural liberalism (Gessler and Kyriazi 2019) in line with other Eastern 
European countries (Hutter and Kriesi 2019). After the 2014 election, Fidesz faced 
increasing pressure from the right, with the oppositional far-right party Jobbik gain-
ing popularity  (Batory 2016; Bustikova 2017). As Fidesz actively competed for a 
far-right electorate by enhancing policies that originated from Jobbik (Pirro 2018; 
Szalai and Göbl 2015), the immigration issue (on which there was no clear issue 
ownership given its low salience) provided fertile ground for an outbidding regard-
ing restrictive policy proposals between both parties.
Originally, discussion centered around border security. After the closing of the 
borders, political discussion continued regarding the European level and the Euro-
pean Union’s proposed quota-based refugee allocation scheme. According to this 
scheme, Hungary would be responsible for hosting 1294 refugees. A referendum 
on the policy was originally proposed by Jobbik in parliament in November 2015, 
however, the proposal was not advanced. Fidesz also opposed the quota but only 
announced a referendum in February 2016, to be held in October, a year after refu-
gee arrivals to Hungary had effectively ended. The question posed by the referen-
dum was: “Do you want the European Union to be able to mandate the obligatory 
resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary even without the approval of 
the National Assembly?” Despite the EU-centric phrasing of the question, the sub-
sequent government campaign was centered on presenting immigration as a risk to 
the Hungarian population, criticizing the EU’s position rather than being anti-Euro-
pean (van Eeden 2019). Indeed, the government’s position was that it was defending 
Europe and European values and its campaign focused on the risks refugees present 
to public safety, cultural heritage, and the labor market in Hungary.3 Hungarian pub-
lic perception of the EU has remained stable across the crisis and referendum (Euro-
pean Commission 2016).
Since the referendum required 50% participation to be valid, some opposition 
parties encouraged voters to stay home, others to cast invalid ballots. Ultimately, 
41% of eligible voters cast a valid ballot and of those 98% voted “No”, i.e. against 
3 Previous research has noted that, different from Western Europe, criticism of the EU from the (radical) 




the EU quota. In our subsequent analysis of referendum outcomes across settle-
ments, we will consider the ratio of no votes to the eligible voting population, that 
is, the ratio of citizens who followed the governmental recommendation.
Since then, the Hungarian government has held additional “national consulta-
tions” and the topic has remained on the agenda up to and beyond the 2018 parlia-
mentary election (Krekó and Enyedi 2018; Bocskor 2018; Gessler 2017). Competi-
tion between Fidesz and Jobbik has remained a driving force of this conflict with 
both espousing policies to curb immigration. In the context of our study, this means 
both gained different credentials on the immigration issue: while Fidesz was able to 
build a track-record of implementing restrictive policies, Jobbik may at times have 
increased its profile by attacking domains in which Fidesz did not advance new poli-
cies, e.g. the country’s residency bond scheme that offers residence permits to for-
eign citizens in exchange for buying government bonds (Jacoby and Korkut 2016; 
Halmai 2017).4
Data and Measurement
To test our hypotheses, we collected data on the presence of refugees in Hungarian 
settlements, specifically municipalities, during the peak crisis months in 2015 from 
three media sources. We relate this to political outcomes while controlling for sev-
eral potential confounding factors at the settlement level. When using survey data to 
test heterogeneity of the treatment effect on individuals, we also employ individual-
level controls.
Exposure to Refugees
We collected data on the presence and movement of refugees during the crisis from 
three sources: MTI, the Hungarian state newswire, Index, a popular online news 
outlet independent from the government, and LiveUAMap (Live Universal Aware-
ness Map), an NGO-run crowdsourced real-time social media aggregator with geo-
graphic information including geocoded pictures and videos. We choose MTI and 
index.hu since they are both reliable sources but are influenced by different political 
ideologies. Furthermore, both have a large reach: The reports of MTI as national 
newswire are used by many other news outlets, including local news stations. index.
hu directly targets consumers and is one of the most visited pages in Hungary, aver-
aging over 1.5 million daily views in 2018 (ITE.hu 2018). Though most of the activ-
ity on LiveUAMap relates to the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, there is also signifi-
cant amounts of data on the events of the European refugee crisis. It has been used 
in qualitative studies of the paths taken by refugees on their way to Europe (Proglio 
2018).
4 In terms of their policy positions on immigration, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et  al. 2017) 
locates Jobbik to the right of Fidesz in 2014, both as almost indistinguishable with Fidesz slightly to the 
right in 2017 and Fidesz decidedly more right-wing than Jobbik in 2019, see Fig. 6 in the Appendix.
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We coded that significant refugee exposure took place in a settlement if it was 
reported in any of the three sources. For example, we include all the settlements 
along the “March of Hope”, a widely reported incident often cited as the climax of 
the crisis in Hungary (Kallius et al. 2016). On September 4th, thousands of refugees 
at Budapest’s Keleti train station, which was closed to international travel because of 
the crisis, began walking towards Austria along the M1 highway, disrupting traffic 
on one of the largest highways in the country. Later that same evening, the Hungar-
ian government decided to bus the refugees to the Austrian border. Soon afterwards, 
chancellor Angela Merkel signaled that the refugees would be allowed to come to 
Germany. We also coded smaller scale events throughout the country, including 
similar spontaneous marches from the Vámosszabadi refugee camp in the northwest 
to the Austrian border, and from the Croatian border to the train station in Nagy-
kanizsa in the southwest. In total we label 51 settlements as treated. We visualize the 
geographic distribution of refugee exposure in Fig. 2.
Though we do not claim that we have identified every location of exposure of 
Hungarians to refugees during the crisis and acknowledge that neutral interactions 
between refugees and natives are more likely to be missing from our data, we do 
suggest that the data accurately describes those locations in which Hungarians had 
a significantly higher likelihood of seeing unfamiliar refugees in a familiar con-
text. The intense public interest in the day-to-day events of the crisis, evidenced 
by Index’s use of a livestream format to disseminate updates, and our use of three 
heterogeneous sources minimize the risk of missing significant encounters. Indeed, 
survey data from January 2016 indicates that individuals in such settlements are sig-
nificantly more likely to report having encountered a refugee in the past year. This 
relationship holds even when controlling for whether the individual reports know-
ing a foreigner personally and whether he or she lives near a border, see Table 7 in 
Fig. 2  Settlement distances to points of exposure with refugees during the 2015 crisis, logarithmic scale. 
Budapest (in gray) is omitted
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the Appendix. Finally, we note that we have excluded Budapest as datapoint from 
our empirical analysis because it is an outlier in several dimensions including popu-
lation, density, diversity, and wealth, and because treatment in the city itself was 
highly heterogeneous.
Dependent Variables
In our empirical analysis we analyze three different types of political outcomes: set-
tlement-level outcomes of the quota referendum, settlement-level election results in 
the following general election in April 2018, and individual responses to a survey on 
migration-related topics conducted in January 2016. We report summary statistics of 
all variables used in our models in the Appendix, see Tables 4 and 6.
We plot the distribution of our primary dependent variable, the ratio of no votes 
cast in the referendum to the eligible voting population in a settlement, in Fig. 3. 
Given the boycott strategy of the opposition discussed before, this is a more appro-
priate measure of the anti-refugee outcome than considering the share of votes 
against the quota. We note that there is significant variance between settlements 
(IQR: 41–52%, excluding Budapest). We visualize the geographic distribution of the 
referendum outcomes in Fig. 5 in the Appendix. In a second specification, we meas-
ure the electoral effects of exposure to refugees on party outcomes at the settlement 
level. Immigration was a major topic of the 2018 election particularly for Fidesz and 
Jobbik, leading us to use the gains of Fidesz, Jobbik, and both combined as depend-
ent variables.
In the individual-level specification, we use data from a representative survey 
of the general population of Hungary in January 2016. Specifically, we rely on a 
rotating module of a repeatedly asked questionnaire of TARKI, a Hungarian social 
research institute. After excluding respondents from Budapest, we are left with a 
sample of 772 respondents, 105 of which live in treated settlements. As for the anal-
ysis of electoral outcomes, we excluded Budapest because of its outlier status and 
Fig. 3  Distribution of refugee quota referendum no votes as share of the eligible voting population of 
Hungarian settlements with at least 50 voters
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the greater potential for heterogeneity of treatment within the city. We report similar 
though slightly weaker effect sizes when including Budapest in the Appendix.
We analyze a battery of attitudinal and policy questions that are included in the 
Appendix and discussed in more detail in the results section. Given the skew of 
the answers towards anti-refugee attitudes, we dichotomize responses into absolute 
rejection and more moderate attitudes.
Control Variables
We collected socio-economic data for all Hungarian settlements to rule out some 
potential confounding factors. Many studies have shown that economically vulner-
able populations are more likely to vote for radical right and anti-immigrant par-
ties  (Betz 1994; Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011). Lower levels of education have 
also been shown to relate to political hostility towards foreigners (Hjerm 2001). We 
therefore control for each settlement’s income per capita, unemployment rate, and 
share of population with a high school degree in 2016, the year of the referendum. 
We also include logged population size to control for the size of the settlement.
Additionally, we consider voting data from the previous parliamentary elec-
tions in 2014 to account for prevailing local political allegiances. Because they both 
endorsed and campaigned for the anti-quota ’no’ camp, we include the share of votes 
received by Jobbik and Fidesz in 2014 in our models.
As we are also interested in potential spillovers of the exposure effect to nearby 
settlements, we use a matrix of inter-settlement travel distances (in minutes by car) 
to calculate the distance of each settlement to the nearest point of refugee exposure5. 
As issues of migration may be more salient near borders, we also note if a settlement 
is within 25 kilometers of a border.
Estimation Strategies
To measure the anti-refugee sentiment at the settlement level we use the ratio of 
’no’ votes to the eligible voting population in the 2016 referendum as a dependent 
variable Yi , the distribution of which we show in Fig. 3. Ti is a dummy variable with 
a value of 1 if we code refugee exposure in a settlement, Zi denotes our matrix of 
settlement-level control variables, including pre-referendum settlement-level party 
preferences, population, and socio-economic factors. i is an independent error term, 
assumed normally distributed with mean 0. In the first extension of the baseline 
model, we introduce a geographical dummy Di for settlements within 25 kilometers 
of any border and county fixed effects i to control for geographic effects like differ-
ent settlement structures.
(1)Yi = i + 1Ti + 2Zi + 3Di + i + i
5 The results presented are robust to considering geographic distance instead.
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We also measure the spillover effect of the treatment to nearby settlements using 
continuous distance measures to the nearest treated settlement in travel minutes. In 
order to examine the effect of treatment in terms of distance, our final model esti-
mating a settlement’s referendum outcome bins observations into categories accord-
ing to their distance in travel time from the nearest treated settlement, with treated 
settlements taken as the reference category.
To address the electoral effects of the refugee crises on parties we use a differ-
ence-in-differences estimation strategy. Specifically, we measure the effect of treat-
ment during the crisis on vote shares of right-wing parties between the 2014 and 
2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections. The specification constructs a counter-
factual estimation of the change in vote shares in treated settlements using changes 
in vote shares in untreated settlements over the same period. The main threat to a 
causal interpretation of the resulting estimates would be a violation of the parallel 
trends assumption that party vote shares would have followed the same trend in all 
settlements had the refugee crisis not occurred. To address this concern, namely to 
assess whether the parallel trends assumption holds, we carry out and report a pla-
cebo test for differences in party vote shares between the 2010 and 2014 elections.
We also use a kernel-based propensity matching strategy (d’Agostino 1998; Stu-
art et al. 2014) to compare settlements using the same demographic and socio-eco-
nomic controls as in the ordinary least squares (OLS) specifications. Specifically, we 
estimate the following model:
where the dependent variable is the vote share of the two main right-wing parties, 
Ait is an indicator separating time periods before the refugee crisis ( A = 0 ) from the 
period after the crisis ( A = 1 ), and Tit is the separation of settlements according to 
exposure to refugees as defined above.
The key variable of interest is the interaction term between Ait and Tit , which 
estimates the true treatment effect. Zi refers to the socio-economic control variables, 
while i is the matching estimator. When using kernel matching, each treated obser-
vation i is matched with several control observations, with weights inversely propor-
tional to the distance in propensity scores between treated and control observations. 
The propensity scores are estimated using a logit regression using the same controls.
Finally we check for heterogeneity in the impact of treatment on individual policy 
preferences and attitudes using survey data. Since the answers are heavily skewed 
towards anti-refugee attitudes, we use logistic regression models in which the depend-
ent variables take the value of 1 if the respondent chooses the response most critical 
towards refugees. We control for several individual-level attributes that have been 
shown to relate to anti-immigrant attitudes  (Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011), namely 
whether an individual has a high school degree, if they report that they are in a pre-
carious economic situation, their self-reported gender, and if their settlement is within 
25 km of a border (collected in the matrix Wij ). We include regional (NUTS 2) fixed-
effects rather than county (NUTS 3) fixed-effects because we do not have survey par-
ticipants from all 20 counties, and in several counties we only have untreated or treated 
observations. To test our hypothesis that treatment affects right-wing voters more than 
(2)Yit = i + t + 1Ait + 2(Tit|i) + 1[Ait ∗ (Tit|i)] + Zi + uit,
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left-wing or non-partisan citizens, we introduce an interaction between treatment and 
whether the individual indicates a political preference for either Jobbik or Fidesz ( Rj):
(3)P(Yij = 1) =  + 1Ti + 2(Ti × Rj) + 3Rj + 4Wij + ij.
Table 1  OLS regressions 
estimating the relationship 
between treatment and anti-
refugee voting behavior in 
the 2016 Hungarian Quota 
Referendum
In Model 4 treatment serves as a reference category
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Dependent variable:
Referendum no votes over eligible voting 
population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.035∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Mins (10) to treat. −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0005)
1–15 min to treat. −0.027∗∗
(0.011)
15–30 min to treat. −0.031∗∗∗
(0.009)
> 30 min to treat. −0.036∗∗∗
(0.009)
Fidesz share 2014 0.430∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Jobbik share 2014 0.212∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Population(log) −0.022∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Border < 25 km −0.001
(0.003)
Constant 0.341∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
County FE No Yes No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3142 3142 3140 3142
Adjusted R 2 0.367 0.458 0.372 0.367
Resid. Std. Error 0.073 0.067 0.073 0.073




Treatment and Referendum Voting Behavior
Table  1 presents our OLS models estimating results of the 2016 referendum on 
immigration at the settlement-level. As discussed in the previous section, our 
dependent variable is the number of ’no’ votes in the referendum as share of the 
total eligible voters. We first estimate the model controlling only for previous elec-
tion results, population, and the socio-economic controls. In this first estimation, we 
find that treatment leads to a 3.5 percentage point higher share of no votes in a set-
tlement. In a second step (Model 2) we introduce county-fixed effects and proximity 
to the border to control for the different geographic effects across the country. Here 
we observe a reduced though still significant effect of 1.7 percentage points. These 
findings support our first hypothesis, namely that short term exposure to refugees 
during the crisis leads to anti-refugee voting. Our estimates are similar to the 2 per-
centage point effect found by Dinas et al. (2019) in their study of far-right voting on 
Greek islands following the crisis. This is remarkable, considering the much more 
transient nature of the treatment in the Hungarian case.
Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 test the effect of distance from treatment. In Model 3 
we observe that anti-refugee voting decreases roughly .2% for every ten additional 
minutes travel time from the nearest treatment. Model 4, in which treated towns 
serve as the reference category, suggests that treatment spills over to neighbor-
ing towns. These models support the notion that the effect of short term exposure 
on anti-refugee voting behavior is tightly concentrated in and around the treated 
settlements.
Change in Party Vote Shares
Table  2 presents the results of our difference-in-differences estimations of the 
change in Fidesz, Jobbik, and combined Fidesz and Jobbik (right-wing, for short) 
vote shares between the 2014 and 2018 parliamentary elections. The results suggest 
that there was no significant overall effect of treatment on votes of the right-wing as 
a whole. However, we see a redistribution of votes within the camp: while Jobbik 
gained roughly two percentage points in treated settlement, Fidesz lost two percent-
age points, compared to settlements through which refugees did not travel. We also 
report a placebo test of the same models using data from the 2010 and 2014 parlia-
mentary elections to test the parallel trends assumption. We do not observe the same 
redistribution of votes from Fidesz to Jobbik across the previous elections. We find 
similar effects when extending the treatment to settlements within 5 km of our origi-
nal treatment and exclude settlements 5–20 km away from the matching (Selb and 
Munzert 2018), reported in the appendix (Table  9).
These findings support our second hypothesis that Jobbik, as opposition party, 
would gain votes in treated settlements from the ruling Fidesz. They question the 
interpretation of previous results on short-term exposure and voting for the right as 
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a consequence of the right-wing’s issuer-ownership of immigration rather than hold-
ing the government accountable. As a whole, the right-wing did not win more votes in 
exposed towns. In our context, the redistribution of votes within Hungary suggests an 
anti-government vote as Jobbik and Fidesz were competing with each other to take the 
more hardline anti-refugee position. Moreover, we note that the same diff-in-diff speci-
fication applied to the aggregated left-wing opposition results in 2014 and 2018 yields 
a null result (effect size: .002, p = .57).
More broadly, the different trajectory of Fidesz and Jobbik in treated settlements 
between 2014 and 2018 contrasts with the national results. Nationally Fidesz gained 
over four percentage points, while Jobbik lost more than one. In other words, right-
wing voters in settlements exposed to the crisis punished the ruling party at the polls by 
voting for an alternative anti-refugee party, while elsewhere Fidesz expanded its sup-
port. We keep this question in mind as we contrast individual attitudes among left and 
right voters in treated settlements.
Table 2  Difference-in-differences estimation results and placebo tests. We analyzed the change in vote 
shares between 2014 and 2018 for Jobbik, Fidesz, and Jobbik and Fidesz (right-wing) together
We find a significant redistribution of electoral support between Fidesz and Jobbik in treated settlements. 
We also report a placebo test supporting the parallel trends assumption. The regressions are run on a 
kernel-based propensity-score matched sample
*p < 0.10 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
Change in vote shares of Fidesz Jobbik right-wing (F+J)
2014–2018
After 0.070*** − 0.033*** 0.042***
(0.002) (0.01) (0.002)
Treatment − 0.040*** − 0.032*** − 0.072***
(0.015) (0.10) (0.002)
After × Treatment − 0.021*** 0.024***  0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
2010–2014 (Placebo test)
After − 0.090*** 0.060*** − 0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Treatment − 0.031*** − 0.033*** − 0.065***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.012)
After × Treatment − 0.009* 0.001 − 0.008*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
R2 (2014–2018) 0.16 0.06 0.21
R2 (2010–2014) 0.23 0.22 0.18




Using data from a survey of the general population of Hungary in January 2016, 
between the peak of the crisis and the referendum, we consider how specifically 
exposure to refugees in the crisis may have changed the political opinions and policy 
preferences of Hungarians. We interact treatment with respondent’s party choice to 
see how this effect differs between left and right citizens. While we have no infor-
mation on previous vote choices, citizens are asked about their current vote prefer-
ence before the topic of immigration is broached in the survey.
One serious limitation of our survey analysis is that partisanship is self-
reported and recorded after the crisis: it may be that exposure to refugees during 
the crisis moved individuals to the right, in particular those individuals who were 
Table 3  Logistic regressions estimating the effect of treatment and association with the right on different 
anti-refugee attitudes
L indicates the dependent variable is asking about a legal or policy preference, while W indicates the 
question concerns general worries about impact of the refugee crisis
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variables: respondent anti-refugee response
No Refugees L: Border L: Culture L: Money W: Undoc W: Culture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment −0.25 0.004 −0.24 0.04 0.96∗∗ 0.19
(0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.38) (0.31)
Right-wing 0.31∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.06 0.07 0.23 0.37∗∗
(0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17)
Treatment × R-W 0.27 1.52∗∗ 0.13 1.07∗∗ 1.39∗ 1.43∗∗
(0.46) (0.70) (0.47) (0.52) (0.83) (0.58)
Border < 25 km 0.25 0.85∗∗ 0.14 −0.27 0.88∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.35) (0.28) (0.28) (0.37) (0.32)
Highschool gradu-
ate
− 0.59∗∗∗ −0.35∗ −0.36∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.41∗∗ −0.37∗∗
(0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
Precarious econ. 
situation
0.23 0.37∗ 0.15 0.24 0.28 −0.02
(0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18)
Male 0.30∗∗ −0.16 0.11 0.02 −0.05 0.01
(0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)
Constant − 0.07 0.70∗∗∗ 0.42∗ −0.39 0.65∗∗ 0.23
(0.23) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 727 752 726 737 764 762
Log Likelihood −485.41 −406.91 −479.17 −471.56 −408.24 −474.53
Akaike Inf. Crit. 998.81 841.82 986.34 971.11 844.48 977.05
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especially influenced by their experiences. We test whether individuals in treated 
settlements were more likely to report support for a right-wing party and found 
no significant relationship. We report these results in the appendix (see Table 8). 
We also note that previous work on Hungary suggests that partisanship is increas-
ingly consistent and polarized over time (Angelusz and Tardos 2011), rendering 
defection across the left and right camp less likely.
Table  3 shows the impact of treatment on a battery of six different attitudi-
nal questions. Besides the first question which asks respondents whether Hungary 
should accept refugees, all questions concern specific policy attitudes or respond-
ents’ worries where responses may be more volatile. We present those variables 
in two groups: the first relates to questions about laws or policies that should be 
enacted in response to the crisis (Models 2, 3, and 4), and the second relates to 
how and why the respondent worries about the potential impact of the refugees 
(Models 5 and 6). Our translations of the questions are available in the Appendix 
(Table  5).
Model 1 measures which respondents are more likely to reject accepting any refu-
gees at all, regardless of their origin. While we do not see a significant interaction 
effect, respondents who vote for Fidesz or Jobbik are more likely to reject all refu-
gees. Model 2 to 4 analyze respondents’ support for different policies, namely the 
strengthening of border protection (2), a law obliging refugees to accept Hungarian 
culture (3) and additional money for integration (4). For consistency, we coded the 
dependent variable in Model 4 as rejection rather than support of additional money 
for the integration of refugees. We observe a significant and positive interaction 
effect for border security and the refusal to allocate more money to refugee inte-
gration. Model 5 and 6 analyze to which extent respondents are worried about the 
arrival of undocumented immigrants (5) and immigrants who belong to a different 
culture (6). Uniquely, Model 5 shows that respondents who live in treated settle-
ments are more worried about the high number of undocumented immigrants com-
ing to Hungary regardless of party, though the effect is stronger among right-wing 
voters. In contrast only right-wing voters express worry that arriving refugees come 
from different cultures. Arguably, left-wing voters and non-partisans also worry 
about changes in their settlement but draw different conclusions from this.
To facilitate interpretation, we plot the conditional effects of our interaction terms 
in Fig. 4. Notably, in many of the models, the difference between treated and non-
treated right-wing respondents is larger than the relatively small differences between 
left- and right-wing respondents in untreated settlements. We observe almost no 
change in model 1 and 3 which measure whether individuals reject accepting any 
refugees and whether they support a law that protects Hungarian culture.
Although not all interaction effects are statistically significant, we believe these 
results provide evidence that it was mostly right-wing citizens who hardened their 
position on immigration when exposed to refugees for a short period. While the lim-
ited size and scope of the survey does not allow us to dive deeper into the under-
lying mechanism, results from previous literature suggest these changes may be a 
consequence of a higher salience of the issue for right-wing voters (Neundorf and 
Adams 2018; Dennison 2019). Based on their lower attention to the issue, left-wing 
voters may attach less policy weight to their encounters with refugees. Overall, our 
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survey-based analysis complements our difference-in-differences analysis, sug-
gesting that right-wing parties mostly competed with each other to present tougher 
immigration policies.
Conclusion
In this paper we related exposure to refugees during the 2015 crisis to political out-
comes in Hungary. We find that exposure predicts anti-refugee voting in a national 
referendum on refugee quotas in 2016. Exposed settlements voted more for the far-
right Jobbik party in the 2018 parliamentary elections, while the ruling Fidesz party, 
also right-wing and anti-refugee, lost votes. Overall, we see no aggregate gains by 
right-wing parties in treated towns. Finally, survey evidence suggests that expo-
sure seems to galvanize anti-refugee attitudes only for right-wing partisans. In line 
with recent research on Western Europe (Dennison and Geddes 2019), we observe 
a mobilization of a pre-existing opposition to immigration instead of a change in 
underlying attitudes. Local experiences with refugees - whether it is direct encoun-
ters or merely stories about refugees passing by - seem to have increased the sali-
ence of the issue and thereby hardened the position of right-wing voters.
In contrast with previous work relating exposure to refugees to electoral out-
comes, our first dependent variable more directly captures voting behavior on immi-
gration issues. Hungary itself is also an interesting case as simultaneously one of 























































































































Fig. 4  Conditional effects of interactions between partisanship and anti-refugee attitudes
1 3
Political Behavior 
significant right-wing anti-refugee parties, we can compare the effects of exposure 
on the support for the anti-refugee right in government and in opposition in the 
same context which marks a second departure from previous work. Thereby, our 
results contribute to the ongoing debate whether defection from governments dur-
ing the crisis is driven by policy or anti-incumbent voting: while Fidesz and Jobbik 
presented similar anti-refugee stances, voters in exposed settlements defected from 
the governing party when presented with a credible anti-refugee alternative. Hence, 
without lowering the importance of issue ownership theory that likely motivates the 
choice of Jobbik as an alternative, our findings provide support for anti-incumbent 
voting in cases where voters do not need to compromise their policy preferences to 
punish incumbents. This suggests future research in other contexts where no radical 
right party was present may be promising.
Overall, our findings contribute to the ongoing discussion of how short-term 
exposure shapes the effect of the European refugee crisis. A growing body of 
research suggests that the length and conditions of exposure are decisive mediators 
in the formation of public opinion about refugees. We also note an interesting het-
erogeneity at the individual level based on partisanship. While Homola and Tavits 
(2017) suggest that left-wing voters become more tolerant with long-run expo-
sure, we find that right-wing voters are significantly less tolerant after short term 
encounters.
Our results regarding the redistribution of votes within the right also lead us to 
caution against over-estimating the impact of exposure to refugees: While our effects 
are non-negligible and statistically significant, they primarily concern a shift within 
the right, not an expansion of the right-wing electorate. Additionally, these results 
ran counter to the development at the national level where Fidesz expanded its vote 
share based on an anti-refugee campaign.
These findings suggest some important policy implications. While most work on 
improving refugee integration outcomes focuses on long-term outcomes  (Bansak 
et al. 2018) and studies targeted interventions (Lazarev and Sharma 2017), the find-
ing that transient short term exposure inflames anti-immigrant attitudes indicates the 
value of investing in crisis management (Esses et al. 2017). Furthermore, the differ-
ence between the electoral results of Fidesz and Jobbik suggests that anti-refugee 
mobilization by governing parties may rather strengthen far-right opposition parties 
in exposed settlements. Some share of right-wing voters directly exposed to the cri-
sis could not forgive even the quite credibly anti-refugee ruling government in Hun-
gary. There are, it turns out, perhaps limits to exploiting a crisis, especially from a 
position of power (Table 10).
Appendix
See FIgs. 5 and 6 and also Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
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Fig. 5  2015 Referendum anti-refugee resettlement quota voting quartile outcomes by settlement. Buda-
pest (in gray) is excluded
Table 4  Summary statistics of Hungarian settlements
Ref. No/Eligible refers to the key dependent variable in our first models: the ratio of voters voting against 
the EU refugee resettlement quota to the number of eligible voters in the settlement. Unless otherwise 
stated, all controls are taken from 2015
N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Ref. No/Eligible 3142 0.47 0.09 0.16 0.41 0.52 1.00
Fidesz share 2014 3142 0.51 0.11 0.10 0.44 0.58 1.00
Jobbik share 2014 3142 0.24 0.08 0.00 0.19 0.29 0.61
Treatment 3142 0.02 0.13 0 0 0 1
Border > 25 km 3142 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 1
Pct. Higher Edu. 3142 7.53 5.98 0.00 3.90 9.40 58.30
PC Income (1000s HUF) 3142 845 246 128 669 1,006 2,226
Pct. Unemployed 3142 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.24
Population (log) 3142 6.56 1.32 2.30 5.65 7.35 12.01
Mins. to Treatment 3140 5.67 2.94 0.00 3.44 7.74 14.31
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Table 5  Translated TARKI survey questions, January 2016
Variable in text Question
No Refugees Do you believe Hungary should accept every refugee, no refugees at all or 
some yes and others not?
L: Border Do you agree that the Hungarian border should be strengthened?
L: Culture Do you agree with the introduction of a law requiring immigrants to adhere 
to fundamental Hungarian cultural norms?
L: Money Do you support increasing funding to refugees and immigrants living in 
Hungary for the purposes of integration (to facilitate their “new begin-
ning” with residential, educational, and language-learning programs and 
assistance with finding work)?
W: Undoc Are you worried that in a short period of time, many refugees and immi-
grants have arrived to Hungary unchecked (without documents)?
W: Culture Are you worried that refugees and immigrants from different cultures and 
faiths are arriving to Hungary?
Precarious econ. situation How would you rate your current economic situation?
Table 6  Summary statistics of 
survey respondents, January 
2016
N Mean SD
Treatment 772 0.14 0.34
Border < 25 km 772 0.10 0.30
Highschool Grad. 772 0.30 0.46
Precarious Econ. Sit. 768 0.27 0.45
Male 772 0.47 0.50
Right-wing 772 0.41 0.49
Left-wing 772 0.15 0.35
Support Fidesz 772 0.30 0.46
Support Jobbik 772 0.11 0.32
Want to Accept No Refugees 731 0.52 0.50
Support Stronger Border 756 0.73 0.44
Support Law Protecting HU Culture 730 0.58 0.49
Against Money for Refugee Integration 741 0.59 0.49
Worry about Undocumented Refugees 768 0.73 0.45
Worry about Cultural Differences 766 0.62 0.49
Met refugee in prev. 12 months 769 0.22 0.41
Know refugee/immigrant personally 770 0.03 0.17
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Table 7  Logistic regression models predicting whether survey respondent has encountered refugee in 
previous 12 months (January 2016 Survey)
Individuals living settlements exposed to the 2015 refugee crisis are significantly more likely to report 
encountering a refugee, even when controlling for knowing a foreigner personally or living close to a 
border
*p < 0.10 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
Dependent variable: respondent encountered refugee in previous 12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 1.937∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗ 1.860∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.230) (0.236)
Respondent knows foreigner 2.684∗∗∗ 2.699∗∗∗
(0.531) (0.533)
Border < 25 km 0.365
(0.293)
Constant −1.282∗∗∗ −1.650∗∗∗ −1.765∗∗∗ −1.796∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.106) (0.111) (0.114)
Log Likelihood −402.415 −364.903 −347.316 −346.563
Akaike Inf. Crit. 806.830 733.806 700.633 701.126
N 769 769 768 768
Table 8  Logistic regressions 
checking if survey respondents 
from treated settlements are 
more likely to report right-wing 
voting intentions, with the same 
individual-level controls as our 
primary regressions. We control 
for regional fixed-effects






Border < 25 km −0.270 −0.285
(0.265) (0.270)
Highschool graduate −0.243 −0.247
(0.170) (0.171)






Regional FE Yes Yes
Observations 768 768
Log Likelihood −508.383 −508.342
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,038.766 1,040.683
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Table 9  Difference-in-differences estimation results with treatment radius extended to 5 km and settle-
ments between 5 and 30 km from treatment excluded from the matching
We analyzed the change in vote shares between 2014 and 2018 for Jobbik, Fidesz, and Jobbik and Fidesz 
(right-wing) together. We find a significant redistribution of support from Fidesz to Jobbik in treated set-
tlements. The regressions are run on a kernel-based propensity-score matched sample
*p < 0.10 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
Change in vote shares of: Fidesz Jobbik right-wing (F+J)
After − 0.036*** − 0.022*** 0.058***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.002)
Treatment − 0.052*** − 0.031*** − 0.056***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
After × Treatment − 0.016*** 0.019***  0.002
(0.006) (0.004) (0.643)
R2 0.14 0.04 0.15
N 2532 2532 2532
Fig. 6  Policy positions of Hungarian parties on immigration and cultural issues more generally based on 
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017)
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Table 10  Linear Probability Model estimating the effect of treatment and association with the right on 
different anti-refugee attitudes
L indicates the dependent variable is asking about a legal or policy preference, while W indicates the 
question concerns general worries about impact of the refugee crisis
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent Variables: Respondent Anti-Refugee Response
No Refugees L: Border L: Culture L: Money W: Undoc W: Culture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment −0.06 0.003 −0.06 0.01 0.018∗∗ 0.05
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Right-wing 0.07∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Treatment × R-W 0.06 0.17∗ 0.03 0.21∗ 0.10 0.22∗∗
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
Border < 25 km 0.06 0.14∗∗ 0.03 −0.06 0.13∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Highschool graduate −0.14∗∗∗ −0.07∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Precarious econ. 
situation
0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 −0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Male 0.07∗ −0.03 0.02 0.004 −0.01 0.005
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 0.41∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 727 752 726 737 764 762
R2 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.08
Adjusted R 2 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.06
Residual Std. Error 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.43 0.47
F Statistic 2.80∗∗∗ 4.88∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ 4.22∗∗∗ 5.65∗∗∗ 4.70∗∗∗
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